Armchair Accident Investigators
https://player.captivate.fm/episode/035bb8e3-3158-4c23-aa5a-1327dbbf9568/
Welcome to another episode of Stories about Flying. I'm Rob Mark.
Av Web published a poll last year asking readers whether armchair accident analysis had gotten out of hand. Slightly more than 600 people responded, claiming it absolutely was because it, “leads to misinformation and conspiracy theories.”
Admittedly, it's pretty simple, to sit back post-accident with your feet up finishing a second cup of premium roast and tell the world you know why some pilots shut down their only good engine by mistake.
But none of us were there to experience everything else that was happening in the cockpit, so really, it's all just conjecture. Wild conjecture is not fair to the crew, of course, but it also teaches the rest of us absolutely nothing about the accident and education is the critical missing element in most of these analyzes.
I think pilots become better aviators through experience, and not all of those experiences are good ones. The trick is to learn without anyone getting hurt. I remember advice a crusty old Learjet pilot gave me 50 years ago, after I'd earned my instructor certificate. “Respect those airplanes, Robbie, even the little ones,” he told me. “They can take your life in a second if you're not careful.” I never forgot those words.
When I officially joined the aviation industry as a wannabe decades ago, I was already fascinated by the final Blue Book accident reports the NTSB published back then. I read them cover to cover, and always put them down, wondering why … why would a pilot or a crew do what they did or skip some step along the way in a particular checklist? Of course, like every other pilot who reads those reports, I told myself I'd never repeat any of those mistakes when I fly. So far, at least, I haven't. Little did I know, though, that I was aiming myself down a lifelong road to curiosity about human factors. I'm no Tony Kern, of course, but, but I'm trying.
Over 60 years, I've been lucky enough to be employed as an air traffic controller, a flight instructor, an airline, charter and a business aviation pilot, and as an aviation journalist, I also spent five years as an adjunct instructor at Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism, where I learned the value of being able to tell a good story.
Today we're facing AI predators that can produce life like videos from written text alone, whether they're true or not. That means it's going to be mighty tough to tell truth from fiction. But I'm still curious. By the way, in 1598 the English poet and playwright Ben Jonson conjectured that “Curiosity killed the cat.” In other words, being too curious about something might land you in serious hot water. I've experienced a little of that in my life too. But I've never for a minute believed I was smarter than the experts at the NTSB.
I've been fortunate to know several current and former board members personally, and I have nothing but respect for them and their colleagues, personal respect for the board and their accident investigation teams. However, that doesn't mean my decades of knowledge and experience are of no value.
Years ago, my wife Nancy and I visited the NTSB Training Center in Ashburn, Virginia, when the TWA 800 exhibit was still up. TWA 800 a Boeing 747, exploded shortly after takeoff from JFK in 1996. Terrorism was initially suspected, but the final report published four years later, identified random fuel vapors that ignited in the jumbo’s center fuel tank as the culprit.
The NTSB later rebuilt the 747 fuselage piece by piece over a metal screen to train future accident investigators. During our visit, we learned the NTSB recreation of the fuselage was nothing short of amazing, awe inspiring. I especially remember a part of the exhibit that detailed one determined NTSB investigator figured out where one particular three inch square of metal recovered from Long Island Sound fit on the original airframe. Multiply that challenge by 10s of 1000s of tiny pieces of airframe that ended up in the water, and you'll have an idea of the work that went into that years long effort.
Today, we know traditional media aren't well equipped to explain the details of an aircraft accident to their audiences. I'm proud to say that's why some of them have reached out to me and others like me over the years. They want to speak to a person who can translate aviation-speak into layman's terms and do it on camera. They don't ask me to stretch my brain for a probable cause. So, I seldom do. That said, when a journalist did ask how a door could have simply fallen off that Boeing 737 in early 2024, I was as honest as I could be based on what little we knew shortly after the incident. Common sense and experience told me there must have been a manufacturing or a maintenance mistake along the way, but that luckily, those kinds of incidents were rare. The media knows so little about our industry that they're usually pretty happy with something like that.
I'm a firm believer in the axiom that if something you read in a report or hear on a podcast makes you think for yourself just a little harder before you fly again, it was time well spent.
Consider a recent story we ran on NTSB News Talk about the board's final report of the Hawker 900 XP that crashed in Utah in early 2024. The aircraft was in for a maintenance check that required dismantling the wings leading edges searching for corrosion and cracks. A shakedown flight is required after reassembly to ensure the stall characteristics of the bird weren't altered. Those flights put the Hawker into a high angle of attack regime and is why test pilots should be specially trained before they try it.
I've flown a Hawker 800 and Citation 650, both swept wing T-tailed airplanes. But I've never flown them into the stall region of their flight envelopes. I learned from listening to pilots way more experienced than me that stalling a swept wing T-tail airplane is incredibly dangerous. One Hawker test pilot told me that flying this bird into a high angle of attack region is, “fraught with traps. Sending an untrained, although ATP rated crew out to handle this is as reckless as sending a couple of student pilots. Making matters worse for the Hawker crew that morning was that they departed into icing conditions.
Really?
How many listeners learned in some ground school that a wing contaminated by ICE behaves differently than a dry one? The NTSB said in their report, the ice significantly decreased the airplane's critical angle of attack. So why didn't these two pilots understand that I wondered. Neither had ever taken the special training required before a post maintenance flight like this one, but they decided to test the airplane anyway. Certainly, the manufacturer, Textron aviation didn't offer the crew much guidance on how to perform the test.
Another test pilot told me the flight was to verify that the Hawker's stall prevention equipment, the stick shaker and the stick pusher function normally. He said the goal was not to stall the airplane. The NTSB report pointed to the aircraft manufacturer's lack of training and experience requirements for the flight crew to safely conduct the stall test resulted in the pilots attempted remedial action that actually aggravated the stall they encountered and led to a loss of control, from which these two were unable to recover.
But here's the kicker. Also contributing to the accident was the flight crew's violation of the few written test conditions that did exist for the Hawker, such as the clearance to maintain from nearby clouds, altitude limits for the test, need for daylight VFR conditions, and, of course, ensuring all external surfaces were free from ice. Why?
Because one of the conditions Textron did publish about performing a post maintenance flight in a Hawker was to stay the heck away from ice because the wing will not stall normally. The pilot operating manual also warned that there's no natural stall warning or aerodynamic buffet before the stall breaks. If you place almost any aircraft in a high angle of attack situation and add some rotation to the mix just as it stalls you get a spin. And many aircraft can't be recovered from a spin. But again, these untrained pilots made the flight anyway and lost their lives in the process.
I wondered why? Was the company trying to save money by not flying a certified test pilot in from some distant city? Was the company perhaps nudging the pilots for an upcoming trip? Did the pilots somehow get their egos wrapped up in the decision to fly. Why would a pair of experienced pilots violate the laws of physics and believe the consequences wouldn't apply to them? Don't try this at home, folks.
In the end, people who believe and share news surrounding aviation accidents they read on social media or hear about on TV that seem, well, hard to believe, do bear some responsibility for those cockamamie ideas taking hold. Conspiracy theories are usually generated by people with an ax to grind. Crazy theories are spread by people who read and accept the words without question, expecting somebody else to handle all the critical thinking for them. This has got to stop. My believability meter is fueled by a simple phrase, consider the source. Readers or listeners to any story, whether it's aviation, politics, economics or whatever need to engage a well-oiled BS meter during our 24/7 news cycle, and too many people don't even try these days.
A few final words of advice. Check the writer's bio before you believe anything you read or hear. If the writer doesn't have one or everything they're saying sounds too good to be true, steer clear. Unfollow them and suggest others do the same.
Don't forget. Not all armchair investigators are created the same.
I do have one request before we wrap up. If you enjoyed today's episode, please click the follow link and do tell your friends.
Fly safely, everybody, and we'll see you next time.
